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Tax reform and retirement saving incentives: Evidence from the 
introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in the UK 
 
1.  Introduction 
Demographic pressures are putting pressure on social security programme 
finances in many countries.  In this context, a common policy target is to encourage 
households to increase their own private retirement saving which, it is hoped, will 
ameliorate both political expectations and cost pressures on the public budget.  In the 
United Kingdom (UK), many households already rely on private sources rather than 
social security for much of their retirement income (Banks et al, 2005) but, as in other 
countries, there has been well-publicised concern as to the extent of a ‘savings gap’ 
between how much working age individuals should save for retirement and what they are 
actually saving.
1
There is, however, little agreement in the evaluation literature as to what saving 
policies work and do not work. There has been a substantial debate around this question 
in the United States (see, inter alia, Bernheim and Scholz, 1993; Poterba, 1994; Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1996), but relatively little econometric evidence relating to this 
question for the UK despite the plethora of recent reforms affecting pensions and other 
savings instruments there (see Disney, Emmerson and Wakefield, 2001, Attanasio and 
Rohwedder, 2003, and Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield, 2005 for some findings on the 
impact of earlier pension reforms on saving in the UK). 
Greater financial incentives to encourage retirement saving are an obvious policy 
instrument. But it is difficult to target incentives on the marginal saver, so that more 
generous incentives may actually reduce private retirement saving for the intra-marginal 
saver through a wealth effect.  The cost to the exchequer of providing incentives will also 
mitigate the total (i.e. public plus private) impact of incentives on saving.  Several 
changes to the UK’s tax regime governing retirement saving have been implemented in 
the last two decades but, from an evaluative point of view, it is hard to disentangle the 
effects of these tax regime changes from other reforms taking place at the same time. 
In this paper, we consider a reform that embodied a differential change in tax 
incentives: the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in the UK in April 2001. This 
reform, which was intended to encourage overall take-up of and contributions to private 
pensions, contained several provisions that are discussed briefly in the next section.  An   2
important feature of the change in the tax regime that accompanied the reform was that 
it only affected a sub-set of the population.  We can therefore use standard evaluation 
techniques to examine the impact of this component of the reform by comparing the 
behaviour over time of those who were potentially affected by the tax reform relative to 
those who were unaffected.  The paper closest in spirit to the present one is Milligan 
(2003), which focuses on differential limit changes and Canadian retirement saving. 
The format of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly describe the 
overall Stakeholder Pension reform but focus in particular on the change in the tax 
regime for personal pensions that occurred simultaneously with the introduction of 
Stakeholder Pensions.  Section 3 describes the data and the estimator used to examine 
the impact of the change in the tax regime on take-up of private pensions.  Section 4 
discusses the empirical results of the effect of the reform on coverage while Section 5 
examines the impact of the tax reform on the level of contributions paid into personal 
pensions.  Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
2.  Stakeholder Pensions 
Stakeholder Pensions were introduced in April 2001 after being proposed in a 
government Green Paper (Department of Social Security, 1998).  Like all personal 
pensions, and some occupational pension schemes
2, Stakeholder Pensions are ‘defined 
contribution’ schemes, in that pension benefits depend on the accumulated value of the 
fund. They differed from pre-existing Personal Pensions (introduced for employees in 
1988) in having compulsory minimum standards, a different governance structure, 
guaranteed workplace access for those working for medium-scale or large employers, and 
a simpler and more uniform administrative cost structure.   
Since April 2001, companies employing at least five people that do not offer 
occupational pensions have been required to: nominate a Stakeholder Pension provider 
after consultation with employees; provide employees with information on Stakeholder 
Pensions; and to arrange for any contributions that employees wish to make to be 
channelled to the nominated pension provider.  Neither employees nor employers are 
compelled to contribute to a Stakeholder Pension and indeed firms employing less than 
five people were completely exempted from the requirement to nominate a provider.  
Stakeholder Pensions have a simple charging structure: an initial annual cap on charges 
was set at 1% of the fund, with no charges either upfront or on withdrawals from the 
fund.
3  Moreover, contributors can start and stop contributing at any time and schemes   3
have to accept all contributions of £20 or more.  Compulsory minimum standards are 
intended to provide greater uniformity between Stakeholder Pensions offered by 
different pension providers than previous pension arrangements.  By making pension 
providers offer a relatively uniform product it was hoped that there would be less need 
for individuals to seek independent financial advice before taking out a Stakeholder 
Pension, and that a more transparent system would encourage greater competition to 
reduce charges.  Further details of the reform are described in Chung et al (2007). 
The Green Paper which proposed the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions 
identified middle income earners – defined as those earning between £9,000 and £18,500 
per annum in 1998 prices – as a target group for the reform, although stakeholder 
pension schemes are open to everyone.  High income earners, it was assumed already 
had access to other retirement saving instruments, whereas lower earners were assumed 
by the Green Paper to be better off accumulating rights in the public second tier pension 
(the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme, SERPS, superseded in April 2002 by the 
more redistributive State Second Pension, S2P), rather than opting for a private pension 
arrangement.
4 Indeed other pension reforms introduced since 2001, most notably the 
introduction of the means-tested Pension Credit in October 2003, also make public 
provision more generous for people with low lifetime incomes, although there is a group 
of low-earners – those with rich spouses – who would be less likely to gain from the 
introduction of the Pension Credit.
5
The Green Paper also proposed a number of other changes to the pension 
regime, including a reform to the structure of tax reliefs that was also implemented in 
April 2001, and which forms the main focus of the present paper.  The broad features of 
the tax regime, before and after the advent of Stakeholder Pensions, are as follows. The 
UK’s direct tax system is individual-based and contributions whether by employer or 
employee to defined contribution pension plans obtain tax relief (deferral) against 
income tax and, in the case of employer contributions, National Insurance
6 relief, up to a 
ceiling of earnings.  The contributions are made net of tax, with the government then 
contributing the equivalent basic rate income tax to the individual’s account.  Higher rate 
income taxpayers can go on to claim more relief in line with their higher marginal income 
tax rate.  Returns are broadly tax-exempt and pensions are then taxed at withdrawal 
except for up to 25% of the fund that can be withdrawn tax-free.    4
Until April 2001, as depicted in Table 1, the ceiling on individual contributions to 
pension plans was proportional to earnings and more generous for older individuals.  
Individuals without earnings could not gain tax relief on pension contributions. 
Table 1:  
Pre-2001 tax reliefs for defined contribution pension plans 
Maximum contributions as a % of earnings by age 
Age at start of tax year  Maximum contributions as 
% of earnings 
35 or under 
36 to 45 
46 to 50 
51 to 55 
56 to 60 







Notes:  Contributions were subject to an overall earnings cap. In 2005–06, this was set at £105,600. 
Maximum contributions include contributions by both the employer and employee. 
 
  An important difference between the post-Stakeholder Pension tax regime 
(which applied to all personal pensions including Stakeholder Pensions) and the previous 
tax regime was that every individual, irrespective of any earnings, was able to make gross 
contributions of up to £3,600 a year to his or her private pension (which, for an 
individual receiving tax relief at the basic rate, would require a net contribution of 
£2,808).  In the new regime, individuals were then allowed higher contributions in line 
with their earnings as in the previous regime in Table 1.  Overall, the effect of this 
change was to raise contributions limits significantly for low earning individuals, 
especially for younger age groups (since maximum contributions as a proportion of 
earnings are lower).  Figure 1 depicts the effect of the change post-2001 on the 
maximum gross contribution limits by gross relevant earnings for the various age groups 
in Table 1.  Note that individuals with no earnings could also contribute up to the £3,600 
maximum.  It is worth re-emphasising that the UK’s tax system is individual-based so 
that each individual in a couple could contribute up to this maximum.
7
Although this change was less highlighted than the ‘targeting’ of middle earners 
in the 1998 Green Paper and subsequent discussion of the legislation, an implication of 
this change in the tax regime was noted in the Green Paper: 
“The changes will also make it easier for partners to contribute to each 
other’s pensions, again within the overall contribution limits, should they 
choose to do so.” (p.63) 
 
 
   5
Figure 1: 
Maximum annual gross contribution limit, by annual gross relevant earnings and age, 
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Emmerson and Tanner (1999) also noted that: 
“The proposals… may be of most benefit to high earners with non-working 
spouses who have already used up their own tax-free contribution limits or 
who want to maximise the value of their joint personal allowances in 
retirement.” (p.12) 
 
In a subsequent defence of the Stakeholder Pension reform in response to the 
apparently disappointing take-up rate, especially among middle earners (see the next 
section), the Treasury continued to emphasize the targeting of groups in the reform 
defined by earnings levels without explicitly referring to the change in tax reliefs, but 
subtly modified the way that the earnings groups were defined.  Rather than referring to 
the impact on those earning between £9,000 and £18,500, the Treasury referred to all 
those earning less than £20,000 a year, thus including lower as well as middle earners: 
 “Stakeholder pensions have been a success for their target audience and 
their introduction has made a good value personal pension vehicle widely 
accessible for the first time….Stakeholders are being bought by their target 
market of moderate earners; around two-thirds of those taking up the 
pension are workers earning less than £20,000 a year….” (Treasury evidence 
to House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2006)   6
Despite this defence, the apparent failure of the reform to increase overall private 
retirement saving has contributed to the decision to enact yet another change in the UK’s 
retirement saving regime, with the 2006 proposal for a new National Pension Savings 
Scheme (NPSS). Under this proposal employees offered the opportunity to join an 
occupational pension scheme will be automatically enrolled into that scheme – that is 
they will have to choose not to join a scheme rather than having to choose to join a 
scheme. Those employees whose employer does not offer an occupational pension 
arrangement will be automatically enrolled into the NPSS and, unless they choose 
otherwise, will contribute 4% of their earnings (between a floor and a ceiling), to this 
defined contribution scheme (their employer will contribute a further 3% and another 
1% in tax relief will come from the Government). The rationale for this change towards 
greater prescription of retirement saving in 2006 also rested in part on the presumption 
that the Stakeholder Pension episode illustrated the limited effectiveness of retirement 
saving policies that relied wholly on individual responses to perceived incentives.  
The introduction of Stakeholder Pensions therefore provides a policy 
‘experiment’ with, in effect, both a visible targeting of a new retirement saving 
instrument on a specified group and a change in the tax regime for pensions for another 
group; the latter less publicised at the time but also having a potential impact on 
retirement saving incentives. We briefly show in the next section (and in more detail in 
Chung et al, 2007) that the former aspect (i.e. the ‘targeting’ of the reform on middle 
earners) had no effect on take-up of private pensions and therefore focus the rest of the 
paper on the impact of the change in contribution limits on pension take-up and 
contributions among the affected group.  In this latter respect, our line of argument 
follows closely the literature in the United States that has attempted to identify behaviour 
in relation to retirement saving off differential changes in contribution limits across sub-
groups of the population (as in Venti and Wise, 1987, and Gale and Scholz, 1994). 
3.  Empirical analysis 
3.1.  Data sources and descriptive analysis 
We investigate the determinants of the household decision to take-out a pension 
and to save for retirement using information from the Family Resources Survey (FRS).  
The FRS is a large-scale repeated cross section survey used to construct the UK’s official 
statistics on income inequality and income poverty and so it elicits a rich set of 
information on each household’s demographic characteristics, incomes (by detailed   7
component) and other economic circumstances.  The FRS asks individual respondents 
who are in work or who have ever worked (below age 65) whether they or their employer 
contributes to a pension scheme. The pension arrangements that are explicitly delineated 
are a ‘personal’ pension, a company-run pension scheme, or a stakeholder pension. In 
addition respondents are asked whether the scheme is contributory or non-contributory, 
when they joined it and if it is ‘portable’, as well as more detailed questions about own 
contributions, contracted-out rebates paid into a Personal or Stakeholder Pensions (since 
individuals can have such schemes without making any additional contributions) and, in 
the case of a Stakeholder Pension, whether it was organised by the employer or the 
respondent.
8  
Table 2 Panel A provides data from the Family Resources Survey for the (tax) 
years 1999–2000 to 2002–03 on pension holdings by type for all employees.  According 
to the table, overall coverage by private pensions has declined slightly over the period. 
Coverage by employer-provided plans has been constant, and a decline in coverage by 
Personal Pensions has been not quite offset by the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions 
and by a slight rise in the number of people with multiple plans. 
Panel B reveals the striking finding that coverage has fallen among the high and 
medium earnings groups over the period (these are the bands delineated by the Green 
Paper, of £18,500+ and £9,000 to £18,500 respectively) for those aged over 21 and 
below state pension age (the sampling frame we subsequently use).
9  Coverage has risen 
among low earners and even (marginally) among those reporting no earnings who are 
below state pension age.  Finally, Panel C splits the data by the fraction of the sample 
that might potentially be affected by the new limit increase, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
While pension coverage was relatively stable among those did, or would have, received 
an increase in their pension contribution limit it was falling among those with higher 
earnings.    8
Table 2 
Pension coverage by type of pension and earnings band: 1999–2000 to 2002–03 
Panel A: Employees only 
Year 1999–2000  2000–01  2001–02 2002–03 Increase 






























Aggregate coverage (%)  64.3 63.3  63.6 62.9 –  1.4 
Sample size  19,549 18,711  20,418 21,648 80,326 
 
Panel B: All aged 22 to state pension age 
Year 1999–2000  2000–01  2001–02 2002–03 Increase 






























Aggregate coverage (%)  47.2  46.8  47.4  46.9   – 0.2 
Sample size  27,259 25,887  28,026 29,657  110,829 
 
Panel C: All aged 22 to state pension age 
Year 1999–2000  2000–01  2001–02 2002–03 Increase 
Coverage by limit increase   
Zero earnings 
Limit increase 





















Aggregate coverage (%)  47.2  46.8  47.4  46.9   – 0.2 
Sample size  27,259 25,887  28,026 29,657  110,829 
 
Note: The sample includes individuals aged 22 and over up to the state pension age, although a few 
individuals have to be excluded due to missing data. The sample in Panel B is that used for the 
regressions reported in later sections.  Rounding explains why figures in the right-hand column may be 
slightly different from the difference between the 1999–2000 and 2002–03 columns. 
Source: own calculations, Family Resources Survey 1999–2000 to 2002–03. 
At first sight, these combined findings from Table 2 are paradoxical given the 
stated aims of the policy.  The data suggest that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions 
has had no effect on overall coverage and indeed coverage by any kind of pension has 
fallen among the initial ‘target’ group of middle earners. Nor can these declines be 
explained by a decline in employer-provided occupational pension provision, since this 
remains constant. Finally, despite the Green Paper suggesting that low earners might be 
better off in the second pillar of the social security programme rather than opting for a 
personal pension, this is the only group to see a noticeable increase in private pension 
coverage.   9
 In Chung et al (2007) we formally test whether the reform affected coverage 
among the ‘target group’ of middle earners using a variant of the methodology outlined 
in the next section.  We show that the only earnings group for which there was a 
significant positive effect on pension coverage were the group delineated as ‘low’ earners 
by the Green Paper, as suggested in Table 2, Panel B.  We calculate that coverage 
amongst this group increased by 3.6 percentage points as a result of the reform.  These 
results are therefore a more precise estimate of the differential trends that can be 
observed in the table.  
The discussion in Section 2 combined with these results lead us to think that it 
might be the change in the contribution limits that had an impact on coverage rather 
than the targeting of particular earnings bands, as highlighted in the two quotations in 
that section which pointed to the intra-household incentives to contribute to spouses’ 
pensions.  Accordingly, we examine the effect of the change in the contribution limits in 
the remainder of this paper. This is done by comparing relative differences in the 
pension behaviour of those who did, or who would have, received an increase in their 
pension contribution limit to those who did not (as illustrated in Panel C of Table 2).  
 
3.2.  Modelling the pension take-up decision 
We wish to test formally whether the change in contribution limits incorporated 
into the Stakeholder Pension reform in April 2001 affected pension saving decisions 
within households.  This reform can be considered as a policy ‘treatment’ in that it 
affected only some individuals (i.e. those with earnings below the limits at the time of the 
reform), and so our basic method of analysis is the difference-in-differences exercise that 
we describe below.  
To formalise this test we write a general model of retirement saving in which Yit* 
is the outcome of the retirement saving decision of individual i and time t, which we 
relate to a set of individual and household characteristics (Xit), an appropriate measure of 
earnings (Zit), and, to capture trends over time flexibly, to a vector of time dummies (dt): 
Yit* = β′Xit + γZit + τ′dt + εit        ( 1 )  
In this section our outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether or 
not an individual saves in a private pension at a particular point in time.  (In the next   10
section we consider the question of how much is saved in the private pension).  If this 
dichotomous outcome is Yit, then we may think of the (continuous) Yit* as a latent 
variable that measures whether or not an individual gains positive utility from saving in a 
private pension.  With a normally distributed error term, this set-up can be analysed using 
a ‘probit’ model.
10   
The hypothesis that we wish to test here is whether or not the probability of 
purchasing a private pension changed differently for those who were potentially affected 
by the contribution limit increase compared to those who were not.  The counterfactual 
assumption required to allow differential differences to be attributed to the effect of the 
policy is that in the absence of the reform the purchase probabilities for those who were 
and were not affected by the policy change would have followed a common trend.  To 
implement the difference-in-differences exercise, we need to define a ‘treatment’ variable 
and a ‘post-reform’ variable. The latter is defined as the indicator It that measures 
whether the individual is observed after the beginning of April 2001. The ‘treatment’ 
variable is another 0–1 indicator,  Lit, that measures whether, given an individual’s age 
and annual earnings, the post-April 2001 contribution limit rules would have been more 
generous to him/her than the pre-April 2001 contribution limit rules.
11  If we could 
estimate the linear relationship (1), then the difference-in-differences model would be 
estimated by equation (1′) in which the extent of any difference-in-differences would be 
measured by the coefficient α on the interaction between ‘had a limit increase’ (Lit) and 
the indicator (It) for the post April–2001 period:
12
Yit* = β′Xit + γZit + τ′dt  + φLit + αLit It + εit      (1′) 
However, in a non-linear model such as the probit (used here), calculated 
‘marginal effects’ on interaction terms cannot be thought of as giving a difference-in-
differences measure analogous to the coefficients from a linear model.  With the discrete 
outcome set-up, the common trends assumption may not hold for the expectations of Yit 
(the saving probabilities) but for a transformation of the distribution of the outcome 
variable; specifically for the inverse probability function, which is assumed to be known 
and for the probit is Ф
−1( · ).
13 
 In other words, the assumption of common trends is 
made for the index rather than for the probability itself.  Following Blundell et al (2004) 
this can be written formally as saying that in the absence of any ‘treatment’ the following 
would hold
14:    11
Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit,; Lit=1, It=1)] − Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit,; Lit=1, It=0)] =  (2) 
Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit; Lit=0, It=1)] − Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit; Lit=0, It=0)] 
where variables are defined as above.  
The right hand side of this equality can be estimated from observations of the 
‘control group’ (those not affect by the limit increase) before and after April 2001.  Using 
the common trends assumption as it is now formulated, this information can in turn be 
used to construct a counterfactual of how the index would have evolved for each 
treatment group individual had the change in pension contribution limits not occurred.  
The impact of the policy can then be evaluated as:
15
I(X) = E(Yit | Xit,Zit,dit; Lit=1, It=1) – Ф{ Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit,Zit,dit; Lit=1, It=0)] + 
  Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit,Zit,dit; Lit=0, It=1)] – Ф
−1 [E(Yit | Xit,Zit,dit; Lit=0, It=0)]}  (3) 
Blundell  et al (2004) propose a method for implementing this ‘difference-of-
differences’ estimator of the effect of the policy.  A different relationship between the 
outcome and the observables is estimated for each group of agents defined according to 
the various interactions of whether or not the reform would have increased their 
contribution limit (which depends on their age and earnings) and whether they were 
observed before or after the reform was implemented.  These relationships encapsulate 
the behavioural patterns of each group and the impact of the reform once it had been 
enacted.  By predicting the outcomes for the ‘treated, after’ group (i.e. individuals 
characterised by Lit=1  and  It=1 who were observed after 2001 and whose age and 
earnings were such that they were affected by the contribution limit increase) using the 
behavioural equations for the pre– and post– reform ‘control’ groups, one obtains an 
estimate of how the underlying index would have changed for individuals in the treated 
group in the absence of the reform.  This can be used in combination with the 
behavioural equations for the treated group to construct the estimated effect (3).  Since 
the final estimate of the effect uses predictions made for the ‘treated, after’ group and 
weighted according to characteristics (Xit) in this group.  It can therefore be thought of as 
representing the average impact of treatment on the treated. 
3.2.1.  Implementing the estimator: data considerations  
Before examining the results of the difference–in–differences exercise, we return 
to a caveat mentioned in footnote 8.  Weekly earnings from the FRS are grossed up to   12
obtain annual earnings, so there is measurement error in the indicator of whether the 
individual is affected by the change in contribution limits. This error would be 
particularly pertinent if we had sought to measure the impact of the reform solely by the 
value of contributions post-April 2001 that were in excess of what the contribution limits 
would have been in the absence of the reform.  In any event, such a measure of the 
impact could lead to an underestimate of the overall effect of the policy, since the large 
rise in the contribution limits may have triggered the take-up of a private pension 
because the higher value of tax-relieved contributions now outweighed the threshold 
costs of purchasing a pension when the individual was previously only able to make small 
values of tax-relieved contributions to their pension account.  Thus the potential ‘treated’ 
in the analysis are not simply those who individuals who we might calculate to be at the 
pre-reform contribution ceiling and who thereby benefited from the increase in 
contribution ceilings as a result of the reform, but all individuals or households who 
received a limit increase as a result of the reform, irrespective of whether their calculated 
contributions would have been at the pre-reform ceiling.  From this more general 
viewpoint, the change in the limits had a large potential coverage.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows the fraction of respondents treated by age by our more general 
measure. 
Figure 2 should be read in conjunction with Table 1 and Figure 1, which illustrate 
that the impact of the limit increase is driven by both age and earnings levels.  At the ages 
of 36, 46, 51, 56 and 61 there are step changes in the likelihood of being affected by the 
limit increase because of the higher earnings proportions that can be contributed at each 
of those ages.  These steps are observable in the figures, especially at the three 
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Figure 2: Percentage of individuals receiving limit increase by age and household 
type 
















Couple - % any increase
Single - % own increase
All - % own increase
Couple - % own increase
















Couple - % any increase
Single - % own increase
All - % own increase
Couple - % own increase
Note: As Table 2. 
Source: As Table 2. 
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Eligibility for the limit increase is otherwise driven by two factors: the increase in 
earnings with age, and the proportion of households with zero earners in each age band.  
Panel A, which focuses on individuals with positive earnings, shows how rising earnings 
over the life cycle and the age dependent changes (described in Table 1 and Figure 1) in 
the proportion of earnings that can be contributed tax-relieved to a pension, combine to 
reduce the likelihood of being affected by the limit increase when only own earnings are 
considered. This also implies that, when we consider only positive earners, the ‘control’ 
group are on average older than the ‘treated’ group; an issue to which we return later.  
Panel A also shows that almost 100% of individuals aged 21 or under are affected by the 
limit increase, and so we exclude them entirely from the regression estimates on 
coverage.   
Figure 2 Panel B, which incorporates zero earners within households gives a 
somewhat different picture of the impact of the changes in limits by age.  Essentially, 
because of cohort differences in participation rates, a greater fraction of older 
households have at least one non-earner who would be eligible for the limit increase 
under the reform regime even if the primary earner is above the limit threshold.
16  Thus 
the (negative) association of the probability of being treated with age is much less 
marked.  
4.  Did the reform increase private pension coverage?  
4.1.  Empirical results 
We estimate the model described in equations (1′), (2) and (3).  This involves 
estimating separate probits for the treated and controls, pre- and post-treatment date 
(2001) using the Family Resources Survey for the four years 1999–2000 and 2000–01 
(‘pre-treatment) and 2001–02 and 2002–03 (‘post-treatment’), in order to calculate the 
estimated treatment effect, as described in the previous section.
17  The regressors 
comprise whether the individual is single or in a couple, age dummies of both the 
individual and, where relevant their partner (structured such that the bands coincide with 
the age ranges for the contribution ceiling bands described in Table 1), sex, age left 
school, partner’s education, dummies for each period within the pre and post-treatment 
regime, earnings (where appropriate) and a full set of age-education interactions.  We 
consider those aged over 21 but under the State Pension Age (65 for men and 60 for 
women).  Rather than present a full set of probit estimates (the results are available on   15
request), we provide key calculated treatment effects in Table 3 with bootstrapped 
standard errors and sample sizes. 
 
Table 3 
Results: Impact of reform of contribution limits on take-up of private pensions for 
selected groups, using Blundell et al (2004) procedure 
By zero or positive earnings: respondent 
  Zero earners only  Positive earners only  All 


















        
All 3.9%  +0.4ppt  46.7%  +3.3ppt  28.5%  +2.1ppt 
        
  Positive earnings only (respondent) 
 
 Men  Women  All 
































Couples 47.4%  +0.3ppt  50.3%  +4.3ppt  49.5%  +3.0ppt 
        
             Couples, positive earnings only, by partner’s earnings/partner’s education 
 



















        
Couples 41.3%  +5.7ppt  49.5% +2.4ppt 55.4% +2.9ppt 
         
 Low  education  Medium education  High education 


















        
Couples 47.5%  +3.7ppt  54.4%  +7.5ppt  51.6%  −2.2ppt 
        
Notes: Standard errors calculated using bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions. Significant treatment 
effects at 5% level in bold. Controls for age, sex, school leaving age, and full age-schooling 
interactions, whether single or in a couple, and, where relevant, partner’s age, partner’s school leaving 
age and partner’s earnings. ‘Low-mid’ earner is defined as in 1998 Green Paper ‘low-middle’ earner. 
Education: ‘low’ = leaving school age 15/16; ‘medium’ = age 18, ‘high’=>18 (tertiary). For sample 
sizes see Appendix Table A.1.  
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The results in Table 3 confirm that there is a positive effect of the change in the 
contribution limits on take-up of private pensions among the treated group.  The table 
further analyses the sub-groups which are disproportionately affected.   
The first row of Table 3 suggests that the overall result of the reform is an 
increase in private pension coverage of 2.1 percentage points among those affected by 
the limit increase.  This result averages across positive and zero earners, and indirectly 
explains the result in Chung et al (2007), insofar as this effect is concentrated among 
affected positive earners (+3.3 percentage points, statistically significant) rather than zero 
earners (+0.4 percentage points, statistically insignificant).  We did not find any evidence 
that the reform had a statistically significant impact on take-up among sub-groups of 
zero earning respondents (e.g. by sex or whether or not in a couple) and so do not 
consider single zero earners further. 
  Among single respondents with positive earners, the total effect on private 
pension coverage is in an increase of 3.9 percentage points, which is statistically 
significant at a 5% confidence interval.  Strikingly, however, the effect among single 
women is large and statistically significant (+5.4 percentage points) whereas among single 
men, the effect is again positive but not statistically significant.  Among couples, the 
overall effect is also positive and statistically significant (+3.0 percentage points); again, 
the effect is stronger (and statistically significant) in couples where the woman is the 
‘treated’ member (i.e. below the contribution limit), whereas the impact on treated men is 
much smaller.   
Finally, we disaggregate couples further by the earnings of the partner.  In one 
specification, we use current earnings of the partner.  However since current earnings are 
subject to transitory shocks we also use partner’s education as a proxy for lifetime 
earnings, where more years of schooling are assumed to be associated with greater 
earnings and/or participation.  A necessary caveat to this interpretation is that average 
years of schooling have increased cohort-by-cohort.  The ‘treated’ are more likely to be 
younger among those with positive earners (see Figure 2) and therefore more likely to 
have greater schooling than the ‘control’ group, ceteris paribus. 
Using partner’s earnings and education, we note that the largest effect by 
earnings group (and indeed the only statistically significant impact) is on positive earners 
with a zero earning partner.  We do not find clear-cut evidence that low earners with 
high earning partners had a particularly strong response to the reform (inasmuch as the   17
coefficient for this group is positive but not statistically significant at the 5% level)
18;  that 
is, we cannot find conclusive evidence for the suggestion by Department of Social Security 
(1998) and Emmerson and Tanner (1999) – see section 2 above – that the reform allowed 
couples jointly to utilise the increased limits to increase pension coverage among the low 
earning partner.  When we use education as a proxy for long-term earnings of the 
partner, we get strong but slightly hard to interpret results.  Treated respondents whose 
partners are educated between the school leaving age and 18 years exhibit the largest 
estimated positive responses to the reform (+7.3 percentage points) while a smaller 
estimated impact is found among those whose partner left school at (or before) the 
school leaving age.  The impact on those partners have the highest education levels is 
actually negative, albeit not statistically significant. 
Overall, the results show that the change to the contribution limits had a 
statistically significant impact; some of the proportionate effects on coverage among sub-
groups are quite substantial.  In particular, the change in limits seems to have particularly 
boosted pension coverage among women (both single and in couples).  These results 
contrast with the conventional wisdom that the overall Stakeholder Pension reform had 
little or no impact on pension coverage. They also suggest that looking at aggregate 
trends and at ‘target’ groups such as middle earners, has led analysts and policy-makers to 
overlook significant effects elsewhere in the earnings distribution and among 
disaggregated groups.  As we have argued above, the lack of effects on middle earners 
may well be due to the details of the policy reform package which focussed its 
‘treatment’, measured as the change in financial incentives due to the reform of tax relief, 
on lower earners.  
4.2.  Alternative explanations and sensitivity analysis   
This section considers alternative explanations for our results.  In particular, it 
considers the plausibility of the ‘common trends’ assumption that lies at the heart of the 
‘difference-in-differences’ model in its present context, and undertakes some sensitivity 
analyses of the results.   
Our results assume that the trend in pension coverage (or more accurately in the 
index of the underlying propensity to contribute to a private pension) among those who 
received an increase in the contribution limit as a result of the reform would, in the 
absence of the reform, have been the same as that among those who did not receive an 
increase in their contribution limit as a result of the reform.  We are overstating   18
(understating) the effect of the tax relief change to the extent that the positive change in 
coverage among the below-limit group would have been higher (lower) than that of the 
above-limit group in the absence of the 2001 reform.  How plausible is this common 
trends assumption? 
Undoubtedly, the overall trend in pension coverage was affected by the change in 
the financial climate from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2002, during which the 
FTSE 100 index of UK equities fell by 31% whereas, on average, UK house prices rose 
by almost exactly 50% (using the Halifax plc index).  This might have induced savers to 
switch away from saving through private pensions (which were at this stage had largely 
equity-dominated portfolios) to invest in housing.  So if above-limit households either 
exhibited greater substitutability in their asset portfolios, for example through economies 
of scale or greater financial acumen, or had different asset portfolios (i.e. more equity-
dominated) this might explain the disparate trends.  
There is mixed evidence for this alternative ‘story’ in our data.  In comparisons of 
treated earners against controls (for example, of single people) it is certainly true that the 
‘typical’ control is older and more likely to have greater housing equity, given the fall in 
potential treatment rates with age illustrated in Figure 2.  This would imply that treated 
households, with lower housing equity (and perhaps less financial acumen, although 
younger households tend to have greater formal education to offset this factor) might be 
in a less favourable position to reduce their pension saving as a response to the increase 
in housing equity.  On the other hand, it is hard to utilise this reasoning to explain away 
the differential results by the sex of the respondent and for couples by spouses’ income 
and education.   
In addition, if instead we focus on changes that might affect the ‘treatment’ 
group rather than the control group, there is one reason for thinking that we might 
understate rather than overstate the magnitude of the effect.  Here there is an important 
change in the benefit regime that coincides with the introduction of Stakeholder 
Pensions in 2001.  As described briefly in Section 2, the period saw the replacement of 
SERPS, the second tier pension, by the State Second Pension (S2P – introduced in April 
2002 but announced in the 1998 Green Paper).  S2P is more explicitly redistributive 
towards low lifetime earners in its design. In addition the means-tested benefit for 
pensioners, known as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), was formally indexed to 
earnings rather than prices from April 1999 (unlike the rest of the pension programme),   19
so increasing its real value for low earners and reinforcing the disincentive to save for 
retirement.  Analysis of these, and subsequent, trends suggests that, at least under the 
current regime, whereas replacement rates cohort-by-cohort for the public pension 
programme have already peaked for average earners, low earners are likely to see 
increasingly generous replacement rates from the public programme for several decades 
yet (Disney and Emmerson, 2005).  To the extent that single women, or couples that 
include a zero earner or have low education (to take some of the groups where we have 
found a significant effect) are disproportionately likely to gain from these reforms to the 
public pension programme relative to the control group, we might expect to understate 
take-up as a result of the change in contribution limits.  
Another possible alternative explanation for the ‘treatment effect’ lies in changes 
in the composition of households within earnings bands. Suppose, for example, that 
earnings volatility grew over the period: at the beginning of the period, in this scenario, 
the rich were persistently rich and the poor persistently poor but that by the end of this 
period, there had been greater mobility so that the lower earners contained a larger 
fraction of transient rich, and vice versa.  Suppose, too, that this was reflected in a growing 
disparity in intra household incomes over time, with a greater preponderance of low 
earners with high income spouses (and vice versa).  If the rich, irrespective of current 
situation, tended to take-up private pensions while the poor did not, a greater number of 
transitions would lead to some slight convergence in take-up rates, which is in fact what 
we observe in Table 2 and the subsequent analysis.   
Given that the FRS is not a panel, we cannot test for greater earnings volatility 
over the period (although we find little evidence of it from some experiments with the 
British Household Panel Survey and the rotating panel element of the Labour Force 
Survey). So we test the proposition using the FRS in a manner designed to test for 
common and differential trends in composition across earnings groups.  We pool each 
‘treatment’ group (low/zero earners below the contribution limit) with the ‘control’ 
(those who would not have received an increase in their pension contribution limit) 
group.  Now write the model: 
11 1 1 it i it it i it IL X X L θ γα = ′′ =++ + ε =          ( 4 )  
Where Iit is an indicator variable of whether the observation of the individual 
occurred during the period in  which Stakeholder Pensions were available, L is an 
indicator of whether or not the reform increased the pension contribution limit of the   20
individual, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables such as age, schooling and partner’s 
characteristics.  This model tests two possibilities.  First, the significance (or otherwise) 
of the vector of coefficients [γ1] tell us whether or not the characteristics of those 
observed among the pooled groups before the reform occurred are different from the 
characteristics of those observed after the reform was implemented.  Second, the (lack 
of) significance of the vector of coefficients [α1] tell us whether or not any changes in 
characteristics over time occurs differently between those in the control group and those 
in the treatment group.  It is this second test which is important for our analysis – our 
results will be less likely to imply the policy effects we wish to identify if changes in the 
characteristics of those observed in the control and treatment group are occurring 
differentially by the relevant treatment and control groups.  In fact the absence of 
differential changes in group composition is a more stringent test than is required to 
support the common trends assumption
19, and so passing the test is reassuring for our 
analysis.   
Equation (4) can be estimated first using data from the control group and the 
treated group who did have some earnings, then for the treated group who did not have 
any earnings and the (whole) control group.  In both of these models the results show 
that our sample is, on average, slightly older and slightly better educated in the period 
after stakeholder pensions were implemented.  This is not surprising given that over time 
the UK population is ageing and that successive cohorts are achieving more education 
qualifications.  
There is however little evidence of a differential change in characteristics between 
those in the control group and those in the treated group, especially for the treatment 
group with some earnings.  For positive earners, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
[i.e. vector α1] are not jointly different from zero at conventional levels of statistical 
significance (χ
2(18) = 25.08, Prob>χ
2 = 0.13). Looking at the individual interaction 
coefficients, the only significant coefficient is on male, which is negative, suggesting 
slightly fewer men in the control group relative to the treatment group after the reform.  
Since men are more likely to contribute to a private pension, this might slightly offset 
some of our results where we pool men and women.   
For zero earners, we have evidence that fewer low educated people are likely to 
be observed after the reform.  The coefficients on the interaction terms are jointly 
different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance (χ
2(18) = 34.70,   21
Prob>χ
2 = 0.01).  Inspection suggests that our control group has a higher proportion of 
less educated people after the reform – that is, the overall fall in the fraction with low 
education was disproportionately concentrated among the treated group.  Since people 
with more schooling are more likely to contribute to a pension, this facet tends to raise 
the measured treatment effect but in fact we observe no significant treatment effect 
when looking at the impact of the policy change on those without any earnings, as 
reported in Table 3.
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Our final sensitivity test attempts to handle the possibility that, for positive 
earners, our controls are on average older than our treated group (see Figure 2, Panel A).  
Although we interpret our measured effects as a ‘treatment of the treated’, it is interesting 
to see whether the calculated effects are affected by choosing comparable controls facing 
a common rate regime.  To do this, we focus only on the age group 36-45, which faced a 
single contribution ceiling of 20% of earnings in the pre-Stakeholder Pension regime, 
contains a 10 year as opposed to a 5 year bandwidth and which, conveniently, contains 
around 50% individually treated and 50% controls (Figure 2, Panel A). 
Full results for this age group comparable to Table 3 are not shown in detail.
21  
However they can be summarised as follows.  First, as before, the results are only 
statistically significant for positive earners and, for single people, only among women.  
The latter coefficient is particularly large (+14.6 percentage points) and significant.   
Among couples, the largest effects are found, as in Table 3, amongst those whose partner 
is a zero earner (+5.0 percentage points) and among those whose partner is ‘middle’ 
educated – that is, to age 18 (+8.0 percentage points).  These results therefore lead us to 
believe that the magnitudes in Table 3 for the whole sample are broadly correct. 
On balance, therefore, we do not believe that our key results in this section are 
driven by compositional changes or by the heterogeneity of our control and treatment 
groups.  
5.  Did the reform increase private pension saving?  
5.1.  Identifying the ‘treatment’ group 
In this section, we provide some evidence on the impact of the increase in the 
ceiling on tax-relieved contributions on the level of contributions among the treated 
group. However, the evidence is somewhat tentative insofar as there are further 
possibilities for mis-measurement and misclassification of the ‘treatment’ in relation to   22
contribution levels in addition to those described in determining the pension take-up 
effect.  Since misclassification of treatments and controls generally leads to a downward 
bias in estimated outcomes, it is tempting to argue that any significant result that we find 
is a lower bound to the ‘true’ effect; however we prefer simply to be cautious. 
A priori, the relevant group can be defined as individuals who are contributing to, 
or could contribute to, a personal pension, with the ‘treatment’ defined as whether such 
individuals received an increase in their contribution limit. However the Family 
Resources Survey only measures the value of individuals’ private pension contributions 
to personal and stakeholder pensions.  Therefore we have to exclude those who report 
that they contribute to an occupational pension from the analysis of pension 
contributions. One potentially important issue is that by excluding this group we may 
exclude some individuals from the treatment group who misreport that they have an 
‘occupational pension’ when in fact they have an employer-sponsored stakeholder 
pension from an independent insurer (see Section 2). We do however test for evidence of 
whether or not this exclusion of occupational pension members affects the pre- and 
post-reform composition of the treatment group relative to the control group, the results 
of which are presented below.  
There are other reasons why we may impart misclassifications and measurement 
errors to our derivation of the treatment group using the FRS data.  We also do not 
know about the value of any employer’s contribution to an individual’s private pension.  
This may lead us to mis-measure contributions to personal and stakeholder pensions.
22  
Second, contributions may be more ‘lumpy’ than earnings and the point that only weekly 
amounts are measured in the FRS while the tax relief limits are based on annual earnings 
becomes even more pertinent.  Note that we do not use the contributions data to 
determine whether the individual is treated or not – this is solely a function of his or her 
age and earnings – nevertheless the change in measured contributions may be biased by 
this lumpiness.  Fortunately we can exclude most individuals in this position since ‘one-
off’ or lumpy contributions can be identified from the data and are excluded from the 
sample.  
We apply a linear treatment model, which captures an overall treatment impact 
that averages across two distinct responses – a take-up effect and a contribution effect 
conditional on take-up.  Unfortunately, without panel data it is difficult to separate out 
these two effects.   23
5.2.  Contribution levels: empirical results  
We estimate a linear ‘difference-in-differences’ models of weekly contributions to 
pensions before and after the tax relief reform using the FRS as before.  As mentioned 
previously, we exclude individuals who reported (or whose partner reported) that they 
contributed to an occupational pension
23 and we may thereby exclude people who are 
affected by the reform but who were misclassified from their response to the question of 
‘type of pension’.
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In Table 4, we provide the results of this exercise in several ways.  We estimate 
the model for singles (Column 1) and then estimate the model for couples in two ways.  
First (Column 2), we estimate a model of the joint contributions of the couple, with the 
‘treatment’ being whether either (or indeed both) members of the couple received the 
increase in contribution limits.  Second (Column 3), we estimate a model of the 
contributions of each respondent in the couple, whereby we allow the impact on 
contributions of a limit increase for the respondent to vary by the earnings of his or her 
partner. 
Before analysing the treatment effects, there are several common features to the 
various specifications in Table 4.  Relative to the default age group (21-35), average 
contributions to pensions peak in the age range 51-55, both for respondents and the age 
of their partners (where appropriate).  The sex of the respondent makes no difference, 
and lower schooling levels reduce contribution rates.  Contributions are strongly related 
to the level of earnings, although in some cases the relationship is non-linear in 
polynomials.  Most strikingly, there is a downward trend in contribution levels among the 
control group over time: the reduction from 1999 to 2002 is over £1 per week for 
singles, rather more for individuals in couples and indeed is estimated at £9 per week for 
couples jointly.  The positive calculated ‘treatment’ effects on the change in contribution 
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Table 4: 
Impact of reform on weekly pension contributions (£): Difference-in-differences 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Method: OLS  Single persons  Couples              
(total family contribs) 
Couples       
(individual contribs) 
Variable  Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff.  Std.Err 
          
Respondent          
Age 36 to 45  1.220*  0.163  1.565*  0.260  0.436  0.267 
Age 46 to 50  2.551*  0.229  2.424*  0.415  1.458*  0.383 
Age 51 to 55  2.300*  0.226  3.469*  0.388  2.312*  0.418 
Age 56 to 60  1.645*  0.238  2.681*  0.382  1.774*  0.469 
Age 61 to 64  1.321*  0.376  2.148*  0.542  1.346*  0.619 
Male    −0.139   0.129     0.010  0.011  0.294  0.212 
Schooling years = 15/16  −0.843*  0.171  −1.524*  0.401  −1.642*  0.286 
Schooling years = 17/18    −0.238  0.205  −0.464  0.542  −1.012*  0.317 

















Zero earner    2.393*  0.184  3.835*  0.793  3.641*  0.248 
Partner          
Age 22 to 35  n/a  n/a  −0.369  0.444 0.601 0.856 
Age 36 to 45  n/a  n/a  1.191*  0.433  1.794*  0.883 
Age 46 to 50  n/a  n/a  2.052*  0.539  1.820*  0.927 
Age 51 to 55  n/a  n/a  3.098*  0.500  2.083*  0.942 
Age 56 to 60  n/a  n/a  2.493*  0.498  2.011*  0.968 
Age 61 to 64  n/a  n/a  1.786*  0.645  1.623  1.053 
Schooling years = 15/16  n/a  n/a  –1.511  0.405  0.085  0.286 
Schooling years = 17/18  n/a  n/a  –0.477  0.546  0.523  0.317 
Earnings n/a  n/a  0.565*  0.073  0.159*  0.020 
Earnings
2 n/a n/a  −0.0003  0.001  −4.18e
−06 0.0001 
Earnings





Zero earner  n/a  n/a  3.842*  0.792  0.355  0.244 
            
Year effects          
Year: 2000–01  −0.378*  0.177  −1.703*  0.508  −0.843*  0.234 
Year: 2001–02  −1.015*  0.351  −8.626*  3.728  −1.482*  0.451 
Year: 2002–03  −1.150*  0.350  −9.174*  3.716  −1.728*  0.449 
            
Had limit increase? (Y/N)  −1.612*  0.332 n/a  n/a  1.253*  0.426 
Limit increase? * post    0.793*  0.355  n/a  n/a  1.011* 0.473 
Family limit increase?  n/a  n/a  −6.608*  3.222 n/a  n/a 
Family limit increase? * 
post 
n/a n/a   7.335*  3.695  n/a n/a 
Partner’s earnings * limit 
increase 
n/a n/a n/a  n/a  −0.125*  0.020 
Partner’s earnings * post  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  −0.101*  0.024 
Partner’s earnings * 
limit increase * post  
n/a n/a n/a  n/a  0.110* 0.026 
R
2







             n/a 
0.2154 
26,573 
             227.69 
Notes: Data source: Family Resources Survey. Default category is woman aged 21 to 35, with tertiary education, 
in 1999–2000 whose income lies above the contribution limit.  Constant estimated. Sample excludes people 
with only occupational pension, and those who report making a one-off lump sum pension contribution. 
* = coefficient significant at 5% level.  Standard errors in (2) are clustered at family level.  
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Column (1) of Table 4 suggests that, on average, treated single individuals 
contributed £1.6 less a week than controls and that, as a result of the reform, they 
increased their contributions by £0.8 per week.  This would not be a large increase, but it 
should be noted that the mean level of contributions among single people per week to a 
private pension averaged only £0.7 per week during the period 1999 to 2002.  This stems 
from the fact that only 10% of single people (once we have excluded those belonging to 
occupational pensions) contributed to a private pension in this period; among those that 
did contribute, however, the average contribution was £13 per week.  Since Table 3 
suggests that the reform increased coverage by almost 4 percentage points, it seems very 
likely that this average effect is an increased coverage effect rather than an increase in 
contributions among existing holders of private pensions.  Note, too, that the average 
change in contributions attributable to the reform just about counteracts the fall in 
average contributions between the pre-reform period (1999–2000) and the post-reform 
period (2001–02); the net effect of the reform of contribution limits for single 
householders was to maintain contributions at their pre-reform level, whereas 
contributions among the control group fell over the period.  
Column (2) of Table 4 considers the joint contributions of couples, thus the 
structure of coefficients is much the same as that for column 1.  Here there is a much 
larger underlying fall in contributions among the control group.  On average, households 
with at least one member affected by the limit change contributed £6.6 per week less 
than the control group and the effect of the reform was to raise contributions by treated 
households by £7.3 per week.  Again natural benchmarks are the average contribution 
over the period among all households whether contributing or not (which is £5.7 per 
week) and among contributing households (which is £26 per week).  This estimated 
treatment effect is just short of the increase in contributions needed to offset the fall in 
contribution rates among the controls before and after the reform (which is about £8 per 
week from Table 4).
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The final results in Table 4, in Column (3) again examine couples, but look at 
individual contributions.  Ceteris paribus now becomes important in interpretation of the 
treatment effects.  An individual eligible for the treatment actually contributed more than 
a control, and on average increased his or her contributions as a result of the 2001 
reform by almost £1 per week plus an additional £0.1 for every £1,000 of partner’s 
earnings.  So if the partner obtained earnings of £20k, the net effect of the reform was to 
increase the respondent’s contributions by £3 per week.  The total effects (analogous to   26
column 2) then depend on the composition of each family’s income – if both partners 
were affected by the treatment and had earnings of this magnitude (as is certainly 
possible for households aged under 36), the combined increase in contributions from 
this calculation would be close to the average effect calculated in column (2).  However, 
it should be borne in mind that the estimates of treatment effects, while clearly 
significantly positive, are not very precisely determined and may vary from specification 
to specification. 
5.3.  Sensitivity analysis and aggregate implications 
This sub-section considers several issues concerning the interpretation of these 
results on contribution limits.   First, we again test whether the results arise from possible 
composition changes in the treatment and control groups post-treatment which might 
affect our conclusions.  We repeat the method described in equation (4) in Section 4.2 to 
test first whether the composition of the sample has changed pre- and post-treatment 
and second, whether this change in composition differs between the treated and the 
untreated.  Note that we are now excluding the sub-set of households where one or more 
member contributes to an occupational pension plan from the analysis of contribution 
levels here.  Formally, we easily can reject the possibility of compositional changes that 
differ across the treated and untreated for both earners (χ
2(18) = 21.51, Prob>χ
2 = 0.25) 
and zero earners (χ
2(18) = 23.91, Prob>χ
2 = 0.16).  Inspection of coefficients again 
suggests weak evidence that the treated group of positive earners have a greater 
proportion of men in the post-treatment period, and that the treated zero earners tend to 
have more education in the post-treatment period.   
One specific concern arises from comparing grossed-up FRS data to statistics 
from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on employee contributions to Personal and 
Stakeholder Pensions.  Inspection of data from HMRC
26 confirms that individual 
employee contributions to personal and Stakeholder Pensions fell slightly between 2000–
01 and 2001–02 but that contributions rose sharply in 2002–03.  We do not observe this 
last rise in the FRS data and the fall at the time of the reform seems to be larger than in 
HMRC data. This may be because pension contributions are disproportionately paid by 
sub-set of individuals who are underrepresented in the data, or because some individuals 
in the FRS misreport becoming a member of a Stakeholder Pension after 2001 as 
becoming a member of an occupational pension plan.  Since we exclude members of 
occupational pensions from the analysis of this section, we may thereby underreport   27
post-reform contributions to such pensions.  This would be a concern in measuring the 
treatment effect if we believed that these misreporting trends differed across the treated 
and the controls but of course we have no direct evidence on measurement error.     
A second general concern would arise if we were to interpret the average increase 
in contributions as a ‘pure’ contribution effect rather than a coverage effect.  There is a 
natural downward limit to the fall in contributions that could have occurred in the 
absence of the treatment since pension contributions cannot be negative.  Many 
individuals in our sample of people who are not in occupational pensions do not 
contribute to a private pension at all – indeed the median weekly contribution is zero and 
mean contributions are around £1.50 per week.  This is particularly pertinent for our 
treated group, as it is apparent from Table 4 that the treated group had a lower 
contribution level than the average respondent; individuals in the control group had a 
greater probability of contributing, and larger contributions which they tended to reduce 
over the period.   Thus even in the absence of the policy reform we might have expected 
a smaller fall in the value of contributions among the treatment group relative to the 
control group simply because for some in the treatment group the fall in contributions 
would be effectively truncated at the point at which they stop saving in a pension. This 
means we have to be careful to consider both contribution and coverage effects when 
interpreting the results reported in Table 4.    
The focus on individual coefficients other than the ‘treatment effect’ is slightly 
misleading because we should take account of other characteristics that are significant 
predictors of contribution rates.  In particular, to test the validity of our estimate of the 
differential contribution changes of the treated and controls, we can gross up the Family 
Resources Survey and compare directly the reported contributions before and after the 
reform by the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups, and also the change in contributions for the 
‘treated’ predicted by applying the average treatment effect reported in Table 4.  In 
addition, of course, these grossed up figures give us some idea of the overall effect of the 
policy reform.  The results of grossing up reported contributions for the two groups can 
be seen in Table 5. 
These results, based on the aggregated contributions data in the FRS, confirm a 
difference in trend in total contributions (which may arise from a coverage effect, a 
contribution effect or a combination thereof) between the group affected by the change 
in the contribution limits and the group that were not.  It can be seen that the change in   28
contribution limits did not offset the measured decline in contributions reported in the 
FRS, but that the decline in contributions might have been some 30% larger had it not 
been for the reform to contribution ceilings [(i.e. 0.05 / (0.21 – 0.05) in Table 5)..   
Applying instead the calculated average treatment effect for individuals who are single 
and in couples appropriately to our treated group, we get an increase in contributions of 
+£0.08 billion.  This is somewhat higher than the estimate derived from simple grossing-
up of reported contributions in the FRS but the discrepancy is likely related to the fact 
that the calculation from the average treatment effect does not correct for the conflation 
of contribution and coverage effects which we discussed previously.   
Table 5 
Estimates of Policy Impact from Grossed-up Contributions  
(Two years 1999–2000/2000–01 v 2001–02/2002–03) 
Group Average  annual 
contributions (£) 
Grossed up by FRS weights 
(£ billion) 
Treated: 2 year pre-SP  46.8  0.93 
                 2 year post-SP  48.1  0.98 
Net effect  +1.3  +0.05 
Controls:2 year pre-SP  600.5  2.83 
                 2 year post-SP  522.0  2.62 
Net effect  −78.5  −0.21 
Note:  Own calculations from FRS data.  Note that the figures aggregate average annual and total 
contributions added over the two years preceding the reform and the two years after the reform.  
6.  Conclusions 
Our starting point was the policy debate concerning the best ways of encouraging 
people to save for their retirement. Stakeholder Pensions, introduced in 2001, were 
targeted by the government on middle earners as a means of filling a perceived gap in 
retirement saving products. The introduction of Stakeholder Pensions was also 
associated with a change in the contribution limits which, essentially, allowed lower 
earners to make larger tax-relieved contributions to private pension schemes.  Our 
analysis represents the first systematic attempt, to our knowledge, to examine the impact 
of these recent policy developments on the probability of households engaging in 
retirement saving and on the amount of that saving. 
Aggregate data suggest that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions had little 
impact on the overall propensity to save for retirement. The numbers covered by private 
pensions was static and there was a downward trend in pension saving over the period 
1999 to 2002, either side of the reform in 2001.  This apparent failure of the Stakeholder 
Pension reform was one factor that encouraged the government to introduce further   29
pension reforms on 6
th April 2006
27, and to announce yet more reforms to the retirement 
saving regime on 22
nd May 2006 (see Department for Work and Pensions, 2006a and 
2006b) with greater emphasis on a ‘default option’ that encourages individuals to invest a 
minimum amount in a private pension plan. 
Our results suggest that analysts have been too quick in assuming that the 2001 
reform had no effect, and also in assuming that individuals failed to respond to the 
changes in tax incentives.  Exploiting a difference-in-differences estimator that allows for 
the dichotomous nature of the saving decision, we show that these aggregate trends 
conceal a more complex picture. In particular, our results show that a trend fall in 
coverage was partially counteracted by the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions, 
primarily through the associated change in contribution ceilings that disproportionately 
benefited low and zero earners. In similar vein, we show that the level of contributions 
among those benefiting from the higher contribution limits did not fall in contrast to the 
rest of the sample who did not belong to occupational pension schemes.  We provide 
some evidence that women, both single and in couples, have benefited from the increase 
in the joint contribution limits within households, which was an additional intention of 
the policy.   To put this in context, there was an underlying decline in private retirement 
saving in the early part of the decade (for reasons that we briefly discuss in the text) that 
would have been greater had it not been for the tax changes associated with the 
Stakeholder Pension reform in 2001.  
In general, our results also suggest that individuals respond to tax incentives in 
making retirement saving decisions – a result incidentally confirming much of the US 
literature on the impact of contribution limits on saving in Individual Retirement 
Accounts (see again Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1996, and the literature cited 
therein).   The results also highlight that it is sometimes important to know the details of 
a given policy reform, rather than just the ‘headline’ target, in order to understand how 
the policy might work in practice.  Since it is common for large impacts of policy reforms 
to be highlighted that turn out to be illusory on subsequent closer analysis, it is perhaps 
ironic that the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in 2001 was quickly written off has 
having had little impact on retirement saving when our evidence suggests that at least 
some of the associated changes had non-trivial effects on sub-sets of the relevant 
population and on aggregate retirement saving.    30
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Appendix Table A.1. Sample sizes for analysis in Table 3. 
 Treatment  Control 
 Before  After  Before  After 
      
All  33,987 36,619 19,159 21,062 
Positive  earners  19,101 21,002 19,159 21,062 
Zero  earners  14,886 15,617 19,159 21,062 
      
Positive earners, singles         
All  5,353 6,154 3,956 4,303 
Single women   3,184  3,748  1,638  1,980 
Single  men  2,169 2,406 2,318 2,323 
      
Positive earners, couples         
All  13,748 14,848 15,203 16,759 
Couples women   9,666  10,327  3,969  4,562 
Couples men  4,082  4,521  11,234  12,197 
      
Couples – zero earning partner  3,163 3,405 4,105 4,453 
Couples – low or mid earning  partner 6,085 6,712 7,250 7,916 
Couples – high earning partner  4,500 4,731 3,848 4,390 
      
Couples – low education partner  9,007 9,386 7,869 8,368 
Couples – mid education partner  2,553 2,950 3,502 3,786 
Couples – high education partner  2,156 2,473 3,777 4,540 
      
 
   33
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For the UK, Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001), the Pensions Commission (2004; 2005) and 
Department for Work and Pensions (2002; 2006) expressed concerns over the ‘adequacy’ of retirement 
saving.  Banks et al (2005) are more sanguine.  Much the same debate has occurred over a long period 
in the United States: see, on the one hand, Bernheim (1992) and, on the other, Engen et al (1999) and 
Scholz et al (2006).  The same issue has also arisen in countries such as Australia and New Zealand.  
2 ‘Occupational pensions’ are, in UK parlance, employer-provided pension plans. 
3 In 2004, after lobbying from the finance industry, the Treasury increased this charge cap from 1% to 
1½% for the first 10 years that a product is held. For more details see HM Treasury (2004). 
4 Under the United Kingdom’s social security programme, individuals can choose to opt-out of the 
second tier of the public programme.  In the case of a personal pension, the DWP pays part of the 
social security contribution (which is a proportion of earnings within a given range) into the opted-out  
pension account in return for the individual forgoing that part of second-tier pension benefit that would 
have accrued had they remained ‘contracted-in’.   The employee can then contribute further amounts to 
their account, accruing the tax reliefs described in the text.  The individual is not required to opt out of 
the social security programme to open a defined contribution pension plan.  For further details on 
opting-out incentives, see Chung et al (2007). 
5 The need to target middle-earners had been queried at the time, since this group already had high rates 
of pension coverage (see Disney, Emmerson and Tanner, 1999 and Table 2 in the text). For the 30% 
who wree not covered, unstable incomes and less accessible savings made pension saving less 
attractive (see Banks, Blundell, Disney and Emmerson, 2002).     
 
6 ‘National Insurance Contributions’ (NICs) is the name given to social security contributions in the 
UK.  
7 Clark and Emmerson (2003) discuss other features of the tax treatment of Stakeholder Pensions. An 
even more sweeping reform to the ceilings on pension contributions was introduced in April 2006. 
Under these provisions designed to unify the tax regime for all types of private pensions – whether of 
the defined benefit or defined contribution form – there is an annual limit on contributions of 100% of 
earnings up to a ceiling of £215,000 (with the floor of £3,600 remaining) and a new lifetime limit on 
the value of the pension fund of £1.5m, rising over time.  A further change which affected all potential 
contributors, was the abolition of the ‘carry-over’ provision for unused limits.  Milligan (2003) 
examines the implications for intertemporal behaviour of a similar reform in Canada.  
8 As a cross check, we examined responses from the General Household Survey (GHS), which asks 
somewhat different questions, primarily about coverage and membership, and also looks at aggregate 
data on pension scheme membership and contributions from Inland Revenue sources. The FRS 
provides detailed information on contributions, unlike the GHS. Both household surveys give 
significantly lower numbers for pension coverage and (more significantly, in the case of the FRS) for 
contributions than aggregate data from the Inland Revenue, perhaps reflecting under sampling in 
household surveys of contributors who make large contributions (i.e. the rich) and of other groups who 
may be contributing but are not asked about their contributions in the survey. However, it can be noted 
that aggregate data on total pension saving has been heavily revised downwards in recent years 
(although this applies more to data reported by the Office of National Statistics). 
9 We gross up weekly earnings data to provide these annual earnings bands. This inevitably produces 
measurement error – for example some people will wrongly be attributed ‘zero’ earnings for the year 
based on current zero earnings.  In addition, the Green Paper sometimes refers to ‘£20,000’ and 
sometimes to ‘£18,500’ as the highest income of ‘middle earners’. In general we work with the latter 
definition in the FRS data, revalued over time in line with average earnings growth in the sample. 
10 It is important that our modelling strategy allows for the discrete nature of our outcome variable: a 
linear probability specification may very likely lead to the prediction that those with zero or very low 
earnings have a negative ‘probability’ of saving in a pension. 
11 For example, for an individual aged 35 or younger, this variable takes the value 1 if gross earnings 
are less than £20,571. This number is derived from the fact that before April 2001 individuals in this 
age range could contribute no more than 17.5% of their earnings to a pension, but after April 2001 this   34
                                                                                                                                            
limit became the maximum of 17.5% of earnings or £3,600. £3,600 is (to the nearest pound) 17.5% of 
£20,571. Similar values are constructed for individuals in other age bands.   
12 The variable It is not entered independently in this regression since the time dummies capture this 
variation. 
13 In addition to the points raised in the text about the common trends assumption, it is also the case 
that the ‘marginal effects’ on interaction terms in non-linear models that are automatically generated by 
software packages (in our case by STATA version 9.2) often do not give a true measure of ‘interaction 
effects’. For more details see Ai and Norton (2003).     
14 Time dummies are no longer included since separate probits are run for those observed pre-reform 
and those observed post-reform. Similarly analysis is done separately by whether or not the individuals 
would have received an increase in their private pension contribution limit and since this depends on 
earnings these are also excluded from this specification. Partners earnings, where relevant, is included. 
15 Despite the similarity to the linear case, the nonlinear assumption exploited here entails two 
additional restrictions on the nature of the error terms: only group effects are allowed for and the 
groups being compared are assumed to have the same residual variance. See Blundell et al, ibid, p.580. 
16 This raises another small measurement issue which applies to those with no earnings who, pre-2001, 
should not have been contributing to a Personal Pension and receiving tax relief – see the regime 
described in Table 1.  Table 2 nevertheless suggests that we observe a few individuals who are 
contributing pre-2001, which arises (we surmise) because they had some earnings during the year even 
though we observe no current earnings at the time the individual was surveyed for the FRS.  Under 
certain assumptions (notably concerning the volatility of earnings), this measured proportion of take-up 
among those with no earnings pre-2001 may be taken as an upper bound on the measurement error 
involved in grossing up weekly earnings to obtain annual earnings, both before and after the reform. 
17 Data limitations rule out using earlier years before 1999–2000 in calculating the ‘pre-treatment’ 
probits. 
18 With the bootstrapped standard error, we can only confirm at the 5% confidence interval that the 
coefficient lies between −1 and +7 percentage points. 
19 The common trends assumption could still be valid even if characteristics changed differentially over 
time across the control and treatment groups, but these specific characteristics did not affect the take-up 
of private pensions, or if differential changes in characteristics just happened to cancel out in their net 
impact on average take-up among the control and treatment groups.  
20 A necessary reminder is that zero (annual) earners could not take advantage of any tax relief on 
contributions prior to the reform, although we measure weekly not annual earnings. 
21 They are available on request from the authors. 
22 However, recent data confirm that, unlike occupational pensions, the bulk of contributions to 
personal and stakeholder pensions are from employees rather than employers: see Disney, Emmerson 
and Wakefield (2006).  
23 Excluding those who have an occupational pension reduces the sample of earners by around 40%. 
24 We also exclude the small number of individuals who explicitly reported that they made a ‘one off’ 
lump sum contribution to their pension since clearly the weekly data give no guide to their annual 
contribution. 
25  That is (0.5×8.626 + 0.5×9.174) − (0.5×1.703). 
26   http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/pensions, especially Table 7.16 as revised in May 2006.  It should be 
noted that these data have been revised on at least one occasion. 
27 Notably this reform again changed the limits on the amount of tax-relieved contributions that 
individuals can make in such a way that the vast majority of  individuals will now be able to make tax-
relieved contributions equivalent to their full year’s earnings each year. 